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LICENSE TO DISCRIMINATE:  “CHOOSE




The line between expressing one’s own view and discriminating against
contrary views is a fine one.  The distinction, however, is important in the con-
text of government speech.  While the government can express a view pertain-
ing to a particular subject and refuse to express contrary views, it cannot
discriminate against contrary views when access to a public forum is at issue,
even if it has created the forum and controls subject matter within it.1
In ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen,2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit upheld a Tennessee statute3 that authorized the sale of a
license plate bearing the words “Choose Life,” despite the fact that the State
refused to authorize a similar license plate bearing a “Pro-Choice” message.
The court held that the “Choose Life” message consisted of purely governmen-
tal speech distributed by private volunteers and that, as such, it failed to create a
“forum” of speech that required viewpoint neutrality.4
The Bredesen court acknowledged that its holding conflicted with a
Fourth Circuit decision that invalidated a “Choose Life” license plate under
almost identical circumstances.  In Planned Parenthood of South Carolina Inc.
v. Rose,5 the Fourth Circuit had concluded that the speech contained on a
“Choose Life” license plate was neither that of the government nor that of the
public volunteers who displayed the plates, but rather was a form of “mixed
speech” that required viewpoint neutrality.  The Bredesen court dismissed the
reasoning employed by the Rose court,6 declaring that “[w]ith no Supreme
Court case requiring [it to invalidate such legislation, it would] decline to do
* Nevada Law Journal, Articles Editor 2007-2008.  J.D. anticipated in May, 2008, William
S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, Las Vegas, Nevada.
1 See infra Part II.A.
2 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006).
3 TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-306 (2003).
4 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375-80.
5 Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
6 The Bredesen court stated:  “Rose relied . . . on a pre-Johanns [v. Livestock Marketing
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)] four-factor test of the Fourth Circuit’s own devising that led to
an ‘indeterminate result’ on the crucial issue of whether ‘Choose Life’ specialty plates
express a government message.  The Johanns standard, by contrast, classifies the ‘Choose
Life’ message as government speech.” Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380 (citation omitted).  The
court concluded that “the Fourth Circuit’s lead in this case would invalidate wide swaths of
previously accepted exercises of government speech.” Id.
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so.”7  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Rose and
Bredesen.8
In an atmosphere where many already fear that the integrity of civil liber-
ties under the Constitution is at risk,9 the United States Supreme Court has
recently issued several opinions effectively constricting the breadth of free
speech and weakening traditional First Amendment protections.10  Addition-
ally, the Court has failed to address important cases such as Bredesen, where
fundamental rights were at issue and where circuit courts were split.  In fact,
during the spring 2006 term, the Court decided the fewest number of cases in
its history.11  Some commentators have speculated that the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to hear such contentious cases stems from the dynamic of an evenly
divided Court with Justice Kennedy acting as an unpredictable swing voter.12
Whatever the reason, the Court’s failure to address these questions has resulted
in a legacy of continued confusion and uncertainty, of which the “Choose Life”
license plate cases are quintessential examples.
The Bredesen and Rose opinions both state that the dispositive issue in
determining the validity of a “Choose Life” license plate is whether the court
classifies the plate’s message as government speech, private speech, or mixed
speech.13  Such a determination, however, is not necessary where access to a
forum rather than access to funds or the benefits of a program are at issue.
Both courts likely erred by rigidly confining their analyses to contrived analo-
gies to inapposite cases with dissimilar facts.  Regardless of how courts charac-
terize the “Choose Life” license plate, when access to a forum is at issue, the
government cannot discriminate against disfavored viewpoints, even if it has
created the forum and controls the subject matter.14
This Note will first examine the evolution of the government speech doc-
trine and ascertain how it relates to viewpoint discrimination and free speech
7 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380.
8 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 126 S. Ct. 2972 (2006); Rose v. Planned Parenthood of S.C.,
543 U.S. 1119 (2005).
9 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Standing up to Injustice in a Crisis, THE NEWS & OBSERVER,
Oct. 20, 2006, at A15 (stating that “[i]t is not hyperbole to say that [the Military Commission
Act] is among the worst ever adopted in its disregard for the Constitution”); Erwin Chemer-
insky, The War on Terrorism and the Loss of Freedom, CR: THE NEW CENTENNIAL REV.,
Spring 2006, at 55, 55-67 (discussing that grave governmental errors leading to a loss of
civil rights and precious freedoms often coincide with security threats).
10 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (denying First Amendment protection
and insulation from employer discipline to speech of a public employee in matter of public
concern); Rumsfeld v. Forum For Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006)
(holding that the Solomon Amendment, requiring law schools to either host military
recruiters or lose all federal funds, does not violate First Amendment).
11 Erwin Chemerinsky, Lecture at the William S. Boyd School of Law (Oct. 5, 2006); see
also Stephanie Francis Ward, Hot Spring:  The U.S. Supreme Court Loads up Its Docket for
April Arguments, but Does That Signal a Real Change?, ABA J. E-REP., Feb. 9, 2007,
available at Westlaw, 6 No. 6 ABA J. E-Report 3.
12 Erwin Chemerinsky, Lecture, supra note 11. See generally Justice Kennedy Will Provide
Key Votes in Upcoming Session, DUKE U. NEWS & COMM., Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.
dukenews.duke.edu/2006/09/supremecourt_tip.html.
13 See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375-77 (6th Cir. 2006); Planned
Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792-94 (4th Cir. 2004).
14 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
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under the First Amendment.  Next, this Note will consider the interaction
between government speech and the “Choose Life” license plate.  Finally, it
will analyze the principal case and discuss whether the analysis of the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals was well founded.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH
DOCTRINE AND ITS EFFECT UPON VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
A. Government Speech Doctrine
The government speech doctrine embodies the concept that, in certain sit-
uations, the government can “speak” in order to promote ideas and policies
notwithstanding objections from those who disagree.15  Generally, when a
court determines that the government is speaking, viewpoint discrimination is
permitted inasmuch as the government can express a particular viewpoint with-
out being obligated to express other alternative points of view.16
However, the government speech doctrine is not applicable in every cir-
cumstance.17  When a court determines that a private individual is speaking, the
government has little authority to regulate and thus cannot discriminate against
particular viewpoints.18  Also, some circuit courts have recognized a third cate-
gory of speech, known as “mixed speech,” that contains aspects of both govern-
ment and private speech, but requires the government to maintain a neutral
viewpoint.19
Because the government speech doctrine is a relatively new legal con-
struct, courts have not fully developed some complicated aspects of the doc-
trine, including how it interacts with the First Amendment rights of private
citizens.20  The right of the government to speak often comes into conflict with
the protected rights of private citizens to speak and, in many instances, one
interest must defer to the other.21  Although courts may not have resolved every
issue, they certainly have not remained silent.22  Over the years, the Supreme
15 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005).
16 See Johanns, 544 U.S. 550; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  In Legal Services
Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court noted that the idea of government speech “flows in part from
[the] observation that, ‘[w]hen the government speaks . . . it is, in the end, accountable to the
electorate and the political process for its advocacy.’”  531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).  The government speech doctrine can be thought of as a sort of
reverse compelled speech concept.  Generally, the public cannot force the government (rep-
resenting the majority by virtue of the political process) to support a policy that it does not
agree with, just as the government cannot force private citizens to support and promote
government speech if they do not agree.
17 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
18 See Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
19 See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).  See also
infra Part II.D for a more detailed explanation of the concept of “mixed speech.”
20 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574.
21 See Johanns, 544 U.S. 550; Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; Rust,
500 U.S. 173; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441
F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006); Rose, 361 F.3d 786.
22 See cases cited supra note 21.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ209.txt unknown Seq: 4  1-APR-08 13:20
768 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:765
Court has heard cases involving compelled speech,23 government funded pro-
grams,24 and compelled subsidies.25  This Note will review each of these con-
cepts and discuss how they relate to the Tennessee specialty license plate at
issue in Bredesen.
B. Compelled Speech
While issues involving First Amendment privileges often involve the right
to speak openly and freely, the Constitution also protects the right to refrain
from speaking.26  The concept of government speech intersected with the right
to refrain from speaking in Wooley v. Maynard.27  In that case, the State of
New Hampshire adopted as its official state motto the phrase “Live Free or
Die” and required all license plates on noncommercial vehicles to display the
motto.28  The State also made it a misdemeanor to knowingly obscure or deface
any portion of the license plate.29  The plaintiff, who objected to the State’s
message on moral, ethical, religious, and political grounds, began to cover the
motto on his license plate with tape so that others could not see it.30  After
receiving several citations that resulted in fines and a jail sentence, the plaintiff
brought an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from enforcement of
the law.31
The United States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to
require private individuals to distribute the State’s ideological message by com-
pelling them to display it on their private property as if the car were a “mobile
billboard” to be used at the government’s convenience.32  Although the State’s
motto qualified as government speech, and although the State had a right to
express this message and adopt it as its own, it could not force others to appear
as though they had also adopted the message by requiring them to display it on
their private property.33  To do so would be to infringe upon the First Amend-
ment right to refrain from speaking or to refrain from being compelled to speak
for others.34
23 See Wooley, 430 U.S. 705.
24 See Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; Rust, 500 U.S. 173.
25 See Johanns, 544 U.S. 550.
26 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (government cannot compel children to salute the flag).
27 Wooley, 430 U.S. 705.
28 Id. at 707.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 707-08 & n.4.
31 Id. at 708-09.
32 Id. at 713, 715.
33 Id.
34 However, when a private individual wishes to refrain from providing funds that will facil-
itate the government’s right to speak, the analysis is quite different. See Johanns v. Live-
stock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564-65 (2005); see also infra Part II.E (discussing
government speech and viewpoint discrimination in the context of compelled subsidies).
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C. Government Funded Programs
1. Government Speech:  The Scope of the Program
One way that the government may “speak” or communicate a message is
by lending support to programs that advance the ideas and policies that it is
interested in promoting.35  When the government chooses to fund a program
for the purpose of advocating and defending the policies that it has adopted, it
may ensure that the funds are spent for that purpose and may refuse to fund
certain speech if such speech is outside of the scope of the program.36  For
example, in Rust v. Sullivan,37 Congress established a program whereby the
government subsidized doctors who provided patients with advice and services
about a variety of family planning methods.38  Funds reserved for purposes of
the Act, however, were not to be distributed to any “programs where abortion
[was] a method of family planning.”39  Plaintiffs challenged the Act, contend-
ing that it violated the First Amendment rights of the organizations, physicians,
and patients that received program funds because it restricted their speech
based on viewpoint.40
The United States Supreme Court held that Congress had not discrimi-
nated based on viewpoint, but had “merely chosen to fund one activity to the
exclusion of [another].”41  The government could, “without violating the Con-
stitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believe[d]
to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which [sought] to deal with the problem another way.”42  The govern-
ment did not infringe upon a fundamental right by simply choosing not to sub-
sidize that right.43
In Rust, the Court observed that Congress’s monetary support of a pro-
gram that advanced a certain policy and a particular viewpoint was government
speech.44  Distinguishing “direct state interference with a protected activity”
from “state encouragement of an alternative activity,”45 it determined that in
establishing the family planning program, Congress had neither suppressed any
35 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574.
36 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-95 (1991).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 178-79 (citing Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6
(1988)).
39 Id. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6).
40 Id. at 192.
41 Id. at 193.
42 Id.
43 Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)).
44 Id.  The Court in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez stated:
The court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of
the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in
later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.  We have said that view-
point-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the
speaker, or instances, like Rust, in which the government “used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own program.”
531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (citing Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 229, 235 (2000), and quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
45 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977)).
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contrary viewpoints nor denied benefits to anyone for expressing them.46
Instead, the government was “simply insisting that public funds be spent for the
purposes for which they were authorized. . . .  The [grantee could] continue to
perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion
advocacy . . . .”47  The government simply required that these activities be
separate and independent from the government-funded program.48
2. Facilitating Speech:  Distinguishing Rust v. Sullivan
The United States Supreme Court has recognized an important distinction
between situations like that in Rust where the government uses private speakers
(such as physicians) and appropriates public funds to private entities in order to
carry out a project, and situations where the government is neither speaking nor
subsidizing the transmission of a message through private speakers, but is
rather “expend[ing] funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speak-
ers.”49  In Rosenberger v. Rector,50 a state university created a fund51 to reim-
burse student organizations for their expenditures associated with paying
independent entities to print various student publications.52  While the purpose
of the fund was to “support a broad range of extracurricular student activities
. . . related to the educational purpose of the University,” the University
expressly refused to provide funds to support “religious activities, philanthropic
contributions and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize
the University’s tax exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria
or similar fees, or social entertainment or related expenses.”53  Thereafter, a
student organization, which published a magazine for the purpose of “fos-
ter[ing] an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints,”
brought an action when the University denied its request for reimbursement.54
In its analysis, the Court squarely addressed the concept of viewpoint dis-
crimination.55  It recognized the general rule that the government has no
authority to regulate the substantive content or message of private speech, or to
favor the viewpoint of one speaker over another.56  The Court acknowledged
that, in certain circumstances, content discrimination could be appropriate to
preserve the purpose of a limited forum.57  However, the Court emphasized that
46 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547; Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
47 Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
48 Id.
49 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.  In the second situation, the government is not saying
“take this message and distribute it for us,” but instead is saying “give us your message and
we will facilitate you in your distribution of it.”  If the government qualifies the second
statement with “provided that we agree with your message,” then it has impermissibly dis-
criminated on the basis of viewpoint. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
50 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
51 The money for the fund came from mandatory student fees. Id. at 824.
52 Id. at 822.
53 Id. at 824-25 (internal quotation omitted).
54 Id. at 825-26 (internal quotation omitted).
55 Id. at 828-29.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 829; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983).
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this type of content discrimination is distinct from viewpoint discrimination.58
“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more
blatant.  Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content
discrimination.”59
Because the University did not exclude the subject of religion, but instead
prohibited expression of a religious viewpoint pertaining to the subject of relig-
ion, the Court held that the regulation violated free speech rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment.60  Recognizing that the government could express its
own message and restrict subject matter in a forum that it had created, the
Court distinguished the facts and circumstances of the case from those of
Rust.61  The Court explained that in Rust, it had
upheld the government’s prohibition on abortion-related advice applicable to recipi-
ents of federal funds for family planning counseling.  There, the government did not
create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to
transmit specific information pertaining to its own program. . . .  It does not follow,
however, . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does
not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends
funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.  A holding that the
University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose
speech it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech, which is controlled
by different principles.62
Thus, the Court distinguished between permissible content-based restric-
tions and impermissible viewpoint discrimination, and then explained how that
distinction related to concepts of government-speech and private speech.  When
the government speaks for itself, it can say what it wants.63  Within a forum,
the Court noted, the government can sometimes regulate subject matter.64
Once the government introduces a subject into the forum, however, it cannot
exclude one viewpoint while allowing others, even though it may still promote
and encourage the adoption of the viewpoint that it favors.65  The fact that the
government is the creator of the forum is irrelevant.66
3. Programs as Speech and Programs as Forums:  Further
Distinguishing Rust v. Sullivan
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,67 the United States Supreme Court
emphasized a different aspect of government speech, expanding on its analysis
58 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30.
59 Id. at 829 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
60 Id. at 831, 837.
61 Id. at 833.
62 Id. at 833-34.
63 Id. at 833.
64 Id. at 829, 833; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983).
65 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30.  In Rust, the government speech was the program and
the forum was family planning services.  The government was merely expressing and pro-
moting its viewpoint within the forum.  Therefore, the government was not restricting abor-
tion speech within the forum, but rather within the confines of its own speech.
66 Id. at 829.
67 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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in Rosenberger and focusing on the governmental program’s purpose.68  The
Court scrutinized the distinction between the situation in Rust, where private
citizens distributed a government message through a government program, and
the situation in Velazquez, where the government designed a program that
either facilitated a private individual’s access to a forum, or facilitated the
expression of an individual’s private speech or viewpoint within a forum.69
At issue in Velazquez was a government welfare program created “for the
purpose of providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal pro-
ceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.”70
The government prohibited the distribution of funds to any organization that
“initiate[d] legal representation or participate[d] in any other way, in litigation,
lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State wel-
fare system . . . [or] to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on
the date of the initiation of the representation.”71  Plaintiffs brought suit
requesting the Court to invalidate the restriction as impermissible viewpoint
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.72
The Court found that the government’s legal assistance program was simi-
lar to the student-publication program in Rosenberger in that both were
“designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental mes-
sage.”73  In other words, these government programs did not express any mes-
sage in and of themselves.74  In contrast, the government’s act of establishing
the family planning program in Rust was the government’s message; thus the
program itself was government speech.75
Although the government program in Rust expressed a message that pri-
vate individuals distributed within the forum of family planning services,76 the
forum itself remained open to those individuals that chose to advocate contrary
messages.77  Therefore, the government was not discriminating against any
viewpoint, but was instead expressing its own view.78  Because the purpose of
the program was to express a governmental message, the government could
ensure that the recipients only spent the funds in furtherance of that message.79
In Velazquez, the government program did not express a message.80
Instead, it facilitated a private individual’s access to the forum of court by fund-
ing legal assistance.81  Therefore, participation in the program consisted of an
individual’s expression of private speech undertaken in legal proceedings, not
68 Id. at 536.
69 Id. at 540-44.
70 Id. at 536 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000)).
71 Id. at 538 (quoting Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-55 to 1321-56).
72 Id. at 539.
73 Id. at 542.
74 Id. at 542-43, 548.
75 Id. at 548. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
76 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-79.
77 Id. at 196.
78 Id. at 193, 196.
79 Id.
80 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
81 Id.
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distribution by private individuals of government speech.82  Under these cir-
cumstances, the Court held that the government could not discriminate in its
provision of funds based on the particular viewpoints that others might use
those funds to promote.83  It concluded that the restriction limiting receipt of
the benefits under the legal assistance program to those not contesting welfare
law was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.84
Velazquez expanded and slightly modified the holding in Rosenberger by
not only prohibiting viewpoint discrimination when the government program
encouraged private speech within a forum, but also prohibiting viewpoint dis-
crimination when the program facilitated access to a specific forum.85  The
Court recognized that facilitating access to a forum in this instance was a
method of encouraging private speech and it mattered not whether the purpose
was to encourage a diversity of views.86  Permissible viewpoint discrimination
was thus limited to situations like Rust where the government was not in fact
discriminating, but rather was expressing its own message to the exclusion of
others within a particular forum.87
D. A Case Directly on Point
Against the backdrop of Wooley, Rust, Rosenberger, and Velazquez, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a license plate case with facts that
were very similar to those of Bredesen.  In Planned Parenthood of South Caro-
lina Inc. v. Rose,88 South Carolina established a specialty license plate program
whereby nonprofit organizations could display an “emblem, . . . seal or other
symbol” that the Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) “consider[ed] appropri-
ate.”89  The DPS reserved the right to “alter, modify, or refuse to produce”
plates that “it deem[ed] offensive or [that] fail[ed] to meet community
standards.”90
Pursuant to the specialty license plate program, the South Carolina legisla-
ture enacted a statute authorizing a “Choose Life” license plate, but refused to
authorize similar plates for those that preferred to express a pro-choice view.91
The Department of Social Services was to distribute proceeds from the sales of
the “Choose Life” license plate to private nonprofit organizations that promoted
“crisis pregnancy services.”92  However, the statute specifically prohibited
organizations that provided, promoted, or referred to abortion from receiving
any of the “Choose Life” license plate funds.93  Plaintiffs brought suit claiming
that the South Carolina statute authorizing the “Choose Life” plate was invalid
82 Id. at 542-43.
83 Id. at 537, 548-49.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 542-43.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 540-48. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
88 Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
89 Id. at 788 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(A) (2001)).
90 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(H)).
91 Id.
92 Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910(B)).
93 Id.
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and unconstitutional because it regulated “access to a speech forum on the basis
of viewpoint.”94
The court recognized that the result in viewpoint discrimination cases
often turned on whether it could classify the speech at issue as government
speech or private speech.95  However, the court acknowledged that “[n]o clear
standard ha[d] yet been enunciated in [its] circuit or by the Supreme Court for
determining when the government [was] ‘speaking’ and thus able to draw
viewpoint-based distinctions, and when it [was] regulating private speech and
thus unable to do so.”96  In order to determine whether the speech at issue was
government speech or private speech, the court employed a four-factor test that
examined:
(1) the central purpose of the program in which the speech in question occurs; (2) the
degree of editorial control exercised by the government or private entities over the
content of the speech; (3) the identity of the literal speaker; and (4) whether the
government or the private entity bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of
the speech.97
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court determined that the
first two factors supported classifying the speech as government speech while
the second two factors weighed in favor of classifying it as private speech.98
The court, therefore, concluded that the “Choose Life” license plate was a mix-
ture of both government and private speech and that as such, the statute vio-
lated the First Amendment.99  The Constitution entitles “mixed speech”100 to
the same protections as private speech.101  Because the government had
favored itself within a limited forum and then shielded itself from accountabil-
ity by obscuring its role in promoting the “Choose Life” message, the court
held that upholding the statute “would require an unwarranted extension of the
government speech doctrine.”102
In Bredesen, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in part
because it preceded the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass’n,103 which the Bredesen court found was control-
ling.104  The Bredesen court maintained that in light of Johanns, it had properly
characterized the “Choose Life” license plate as government speech, justifying
its arrival at a conclusion that was not in accord with that of Rose.105
94 Id. at 789.
95 Id. at 792.
96 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of
the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)).
97 Id. at 792-93 (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 288 F.3d at 618).
98 Id. at 793-94.
99 Id. at 793.
100 The court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had never recognized
“mixed speech” as a category, but relied on an analyses of Rust, Roseberger, and Velazquez
to defend its conclusion as one in which the Supreme Court would approve. Id. at 795.
However, the United State Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rose.  Rose v. Planned
Parenthood of S.C., 543 U.S. 1119 (2005).
101 Rose, 361 F.3d at 795.
102 Id. at 795-96.
103 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
104 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006).
105 Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ209.txt unknown Seq: 11  1-APR-08 13:20
Winter 2008] LICENSE TO DISCRIMINATE 775
E. Compelled Subsidies:  A Case Directly on Point?
Sometimes, in order to promote a specific message, the government will
seek the assistance of private individuals or organizations.106  In Johanns, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether and to what extent
private involvement in creating or distributing a “government” message affects
the message’s classification as government speech.107  The Court also explored
the distinction between cases that involved compelled speech and those that
involved compelled subsidies or taxes.108
At issue in Johanns was a federal program whereby the government
financed generic advertising campaigns that promoted certain agricultural prod-
ucts.109  Using funds that were collected from a tax that it imposed on the sale
or importation of cattle, the government began to promote the “marketing and
consumption of ‘beef and beef products’” through advertisements that bore the
message:  “Beef.  It’s What’s for Dinner.”110  Private entities assisted the gov-
ernment in developing and distributing this message.111
A group of plaintiffs objected to the tax, contending that it forced them to
subsidize private speech with which they did not agree.112  Because the govern-
ment cannot compel individuals to subsidize the speech of private entities,113
but can compel subsidization in support of its own speech,114 the outcome of
the case turned on whether the message promoting the beef was government
speech or private speech.115  Plaintiffs argued that the speech was private
because private entities created and distributed the message, and because the
tax that the government imposed to support the campaign was not general, but
instead targeted a specific group.116
The Court held that the beef advertising campaign was government speech
despite the fact that non-governmental entities helped to design it because the
federal government was in control of the message.117  “When, as here, the gov-
ernment sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every word
that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech
doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in
106 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
107 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-62.
108 See id. at 557-59.
109 Id. at 553.
110 Id. at 553-54.
111 Id. at 560-62.
112 Id. at 555.
113 See id. at 559; see also Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that
mandatory state bar dues that fund political or ideological activities violate free speech under
the First Amendment); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (holding
that mandatory union dues that fund political or ideological activities do not violate the First
Amendment, so long as they are “financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by
employees who do not object to advancing those ideas”).
114 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559; see also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (holding that mandatory student activity fee that
funds political or ideological activities does not violate First Amendment, so long as univer-
sity allocates funds without regard to viewpoint).
115 Johanns, 554 U.S. at 563.
116 Id. at 560.
117 Id. at 562.
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developing specific messages.”118  The Court also found that it was of no con-
sequence that the government did not identify itself as the speaker in the adver-
tisements119 and that it was irrelevant whether the government derived the
funds to support its speech from a general or targeted tax.120  As the federal
program failed to offend any First Amendment rights, plaintiffs “enjoy[ed] no
right not to fund government speech.”121
III. ACLU OF TENNESSEE V. BREDESEN
The dispute in Bredesen122 involved a Tennessee law that authorized the
sale of specialty license plates and directed some of the revenue derived from
such sales to “departments, agencies, charities, programs and other activities
impacting Tennessee.”123  The statute devoted and distributed half of the prof-
its obtained from the sales of the license plates to specific groups that advanced
the organization or cause that the license plate promoted.124  In 2003, pursuant
to this statutory scheme, the Tennessee legislature approved the issuance of a
“Choose Life”125 specialty license plate,126 but declined to issue a “Pro-
Choice” specialty license plate despite requests from lobbyists.127
Plaintiffs128 brought an action in federal district court, contending that the
statute authorizing the “Choose Life” specialty license plate was unconstitu-
118 Id.
119 The court noted:
If a viewer would identify the speech as [Plaintiffs’], however, the analysis would be differ-
ent. . . .  [T]here might be a valid objection if “those singled out to pay the tax are closely linked
with the expression” in a way that makes them appear to endorse the government message.  But
this compelled-speech argument (like the Wooley and Barnette opinions on which it draws)
differs substantively from the compelled-subsidy analysis.  The latter invalidates an exaction not
because being forced to pay for speech that is unattributed violates personal autonomy, but
because being forced to fund someone else’s private speech unconnected to any legitimate gov-
ernment purpose violates personal autonomy.  Such a violation does not occur when the exaction
funds government speech.
Id. at 564 n.7, 565 n.8 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 575-76 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
120 Id. at 564.
121 Id. at 564 n.7.
122 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006).
123 Id. at 372 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201(j) (2003)).
124 Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-4-215 to -217).  The government keeps the other half
of the profits. Id.
125 The slogan “Choose Life” not only promotes a pro-life viewpoint, but also comments on
the pro-choice viewpoint through the use of parodic elements.  The slogan takes the essence
of one viewpoint—“choice”—and twists it to support its own view—“Choose Life.”
126 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-306).  Funds derived from
the sales of the “Choose Life” license plate were to be “used exclusively for counseling and
financial assistance, including food, clothing, and medical assistance for pregnant women in
Tennessee.” Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-306(c)).
127 Id.
128 Plaintiffs included the American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee, Planned
Parenthood of Middle and East Tennessee, Inc., Sally Levine, Hilary Chiz, and Joe Sweat.
Defendants included Philip Bredesen (Governor of Tennessee), Fred Phillips (Tennessee
Commissioner of Safety), Friends of Great Smoky Mountains National Park, Inc. (a non-
profit North Carolina corporation), and New Life Resources, Inc. (beneficiary under the
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tional129 because it impermissibly discriminated according to viewpoint.130
Analyzing the distinction between “government speech” and “private speech,”
the district court determined that the “Choose Life” specialty license plate was
purely neither.131  The court followed Fourth Circuit precedent established in
Rose132 and held that, as a “mixture” of both government and private speech,
the statute authorizing the “Choose Life” license plate was unconstitutional
because it allowed the government to discriminate against and thus suppress
unpopular viewpoints.133  Accordingly, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Defendants appealed.134
Having determined that the district court properly exercised its authority
with regard to subject matter jurisdiction,135 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether and to what extent private involvement in creating or dis-
tributing the “Choose Life” license plate affected the message’s classification
as government speech, private speech, or mixed speech.136  Relying primarily
upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns, the appellate
court concluded that the “Choose Life” license plates bore a “government-
crafted message.”137
The appellate court found that private citizens had assisted the government
in crafting and disseminating the specific “Choose Life” message.138  However,
as in Johanns, this fact did not preclude the court from characterizing the mes-
statute and intervening defendant).  ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d 770, 771-
72 (M.D. Tenn. 2004).
129 Id.  Plaintiffs alternatively contended that the entire “specialty license plate” program
was unconstitutional. Id.  However, the district court found it unnecessary to address that
particular issue. Id. at 774.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 773.
132 Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
133 Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 773-74.
134 The State defendants did not appeal (although they filed a brief asking the court not to
invalidate the entire specialty license plate legislation).  Only the intervening defendant, New
Life Resources, Inc. (beneficiary under the statute), appealed the district court’s decision.
ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2006).
135 See id. at 373-75.  In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit determined that the fees
the government received from specialty license plate sales did not qualify as a tax. Id.
Instead, the court found that the fees resembled payments for purchases from the government
acting as an ordinary market participant rather than in its usual capacity as a sovereign
power. Id. at 373-74.  In other words, the fee was akin to a simple “debt.” Id.  While a tax
is an “in invitum” (meaning “[a]gainst an unwilling person”), id. at 373 n.2 (alteration in
original) (quoting BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 787 (7th ed. 1999)), “pecuniary burden laid
upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the [g]overnment,” a debt is an
obligation “for the payment of money founded upon contract.”  Id. at 373 (internal quotation
omitted).  The purpose of a tax is to acquire funds to support either the government, or
something that the government chooses to support.  Id. at 373-74.  In contrast to payment of
debts, courts do not require consent from the taxpayer to obtain taxes.  Id. at 374.  As the
specialty license plate fee was not a “tax,” the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000),
was not applicable; thus the district court properly exercised its authority with regard to
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 373-75.
136 See id. at 375-77.
137 See id. at 375-78, 380.
138 See id. at 377.
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sage as government speech so long as the government controlled and approved
it.139  The court reasoned that Tennessee prescribed the policy behind the pro-
gram, as well as its specific “Choose Life” message and “approve[d] every
word that [was] disseminated.”140  The court observed that participation by
public organizations in crafting the message was of no consequence to the
court’s determination and that the “government-crafted message [was] govern-
ment speech even if the government [did] not explicitly credit itself as the
speaker.”141  Moreover, the court noted, the plaintiffs’ position would have
forced the government to provide specialty license plates to any organization,
including institutions of disrepute.142
Having determined that the “Choose Life” message was government
speech, the court framed the next issue for analysis as “whether a government-
crafted message disseminated by private volunteers create[d] a ‘forum’ for
speech that must be viewpoint neutral.”143  Failing to acknowledge that a forum
might exist independently from a message, the court held that the “Choose
Life” message did not create a “forum” that required the government to remain
neutral with respect to viewpoint.144  Therefore, the government could choose
to promote a specific message even if those that disagreed could not express a
contrary message through the same medium.145
To support this notion the court pointed to Johanns and Rust, noting that
“[i]n general, the government does not create a ‘forum’ for expression when it
seeks to have private entities disseminate its message.”146  In Johanns, the
Court determined that government speech was impervious to challenges of
viewpoint discrimination regardless of whether the government had paid non-
governmental entities to design and disseminate its message.147  Similarly, in
Rust, the government paid private entities with public funds to communicate its
message, and the Court determined that no viewpoint discrimination had
occurred.148  According to the Bredesen court, the result in Johanns or Rust
would have been no different had the public entities in those cases disseminated
the government’s message for free or paid for the privilege.149  Therefore, the
court concluded that the government’s receipt of payment was inconsequential
and did not create a “forum” for speech that the First Amendment protects.150
The Sixth Circuit also dismissed the reasoning that the Fourth Circuit
employed in Rose to find “mixed speech,” stating a similar application of the
four-part test would serve to either invalidate all prior forms of privately dis-
seminated government speech, or force the court to construct a distinction
139 See id. at 375-77.
140 Id. at 376 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005)).
141 Id. at 377.
142 Id. at 376-77.
143 Id. at 375.
144 Id. at 377.
145 Id. at 378-79.
146 Id. at 378.
147 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560-62 (2005); see also Bredesen, 441
F.3d at 378.
148 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-200 (1991).
149 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 378.
150 Id.
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between such prior forms and the “Choose Life” license plates.151  Because
applying the Rose test provided an indeterminate result regarding the issue of
whether a court should characterize a “Choose Life” license plate as govern-
ment or private speech, and because the court decided Rose prior to the ruling
in Johanns, which provided a definite result, Rose was inapplicable.152
In light of Johanns, the appellate court concluded that the “Choose Life”
license plate program was government speech and did not violate the First
Amendment.153  Although the court conceded “voluntary dissemination itself
qualifies as expressive conduct,” it found that such “reliance on private volun-
teers to express [government] policies [did] not create a ‘forum’ for speech
requiring viewpoint neutrality.”154  Despite the fact that the appellate court
found the “exercise of government one-sidedness with respect to a very conten-
tious political issue [to] be ill-advised,” the court upheld the Tennessee statute
declaring that it did not offend any rights under the First Amendment.155  The
“[g]overnment can certainly speak out on public issues supported by a broad
consensus, even though individuals have a First Amendment right not to
express agreement.”156
Circuit Judge Martin F. Boyce concurred in part and dissented in part.  He
agreed with the majority’s holding that the specialty license plate fee was not a
tax and that subject matter jurisdiction in the district court was proper.157
Boyce did not agree, however, with the remainder of the majority’s opinion.158
Judge Boyce observed that the purpose of the specialty license plate pro-
gram was not to promote a government message, but rather to facilitate private
speech.159  He viewed the specialty license plate program as a forum that
required viewpoint neutrality despite the fact that the program contained some
undeniable aspects of government speech.160  Therefore, regardless of whether
the message was government-crafted, the government could not suppress disfa-
vored messages from the forum based on viewpoint.161  The majority had
reached a contrary conclusion because it had failed to consider the “nature of
the license plate forum.”162
Boyce also contended that the majority’s reliance on Johanns and the
compelled subsidy doctrine was improper because participation in the specialty
license plate program was entirely voluntary.163  The First Amendment harm of
which the plaintiffs in Johanns complained was government compulsion to
151 Id. at 378-80.
152 Id. at 380.
153 Id. at 372, 375.
154 Id. at 377.
155 Id. at 372.
156 Id. at 379.
157 Id. at 380 (Boyce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158 Id. at 380-81.
159 Id. at 381-85.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 381 n.2.
163 Id. at 381, 385-87.
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speak or to subsidize a disagreeable message.164  The analysis applicable to
harm associated with denial of “the opportunity to speak on the same terms as
other private citizens within a government sponsored forum” was of a different
nature.165
For these reasons, Boyce would have held that “[a]lthough the government
may generally speak and control its own message, it may not suppress contrary
messages because of their viewpoint in a forum designed to encourage a diver-
sity of views from private speakers.”166
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN BREDESEN
The Bredesen court concluded that the government had an unqualified
right to express its “Choose Life” message in part because the purpose of the
“Choose Life” specialty license plate program was to promote a government
message.167  The court determined that under Johanns and Rust,168 it was
proper to classify the “Choose Life” license plate as government speech.169
However, the validity of the “Choose Life” license plate was not depen-
dent solely upon whether the court classified the message as government
speech.  Under the circumstances of Bredesen, the court should have declared
the “Choose Life” license plate to be invalid because of the government’s
refusal to issue a “Pro-Choice” license plate within the broader specialty
license plate program, where the Constitution prohibits viewpoint discrimina-
tion regardless of whether the “Choose Life” plate was government speech.
The root of the court’s apparent confusion was that it failed to distinguish
between the “Choose Life” license plate program and the broader specialty
license plate program.  In doing so, it applied the wrong analysis to the question
of whether it could preclude the contrary message proposed by the plaintiffs.
Because the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the “Choose Life” license plate
program within the context of the broader specialty license plate program, the
validity of the “Choose Life” license plate should have depended upon whether
the subject of abortion was permissible within the broader specialty license
plate program.  Presumably, the government would have had no authority to
issue a “Choose Life” license plate within the specialty license plate program
unless abortion was a permissible subject.  So long as the government allowed
the subject of abortion, yet refused to issue a pro-choice license plate, the
“Choose Life” license plate would be invalid regardless of its purpose and
regardless of whether the court properly classified it as government speech.
As Judge Boyce noted in his dissenting opinion, the dispute in Bredesen
revolved around the specialty license plate statute, not the “Choose Life”
164 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564-65 (2005); see supra note 112 and
accompanying text; see also Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385-87 (Boyce, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
165 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385-87 (Boyce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166 Id. at 381.
167 See id. at 375-80 (majority opinion).
168 The majority did not consider Rosenberger or Velazquez in its analysis. See Bredesen,
441 F.3d 370.
169 See id. at 375-80.
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license plate statute.170  The court was confused about which of these consti-
tuted the forum in part because of the way the plaintiffs framed their cause of
action.  The plaintiffs’ contention was that the “Choose Life” license plate stat-
ute was unconstitutional, or alternatively that the specialty license plate statute
was unconstitutional.171  However, the plaintiffs should have argued instead
that the legislature’s decision to exclude other viewpoints on abortion from the
broader specialty license plate forum was unconstitutional.
This Note will first examine the “Choose Life” license plate program in
order to determine whether the court properly characterized it as government
speech and whether viewpoint discrimination was permissible.  Next, it will
consider whether the broader specialty license plate forum consists of govern-
ment speech and whether the First Amendment permits viewpoint discrimina-
tion in that context.
A. The “Choose Life” License Plate Program
In order to determine whether the “Choose Life” license plate program is
government, private, or mixed speech, it is important to understand the extent
to which Johanns controls and modifies the four-factor test that the Fourth
Circuit applied in Rose.  An analysis of Rust and Rosenberger also provides
insight into the nature of the “Choose Life” license plate program and the ques-
tion of whether its purpose is to promote government speech or facilitate pri-
vate speech and access to a forum.
The Bredesen court was correct to rely on Johanns to determine whether
the “Choose Life” specialty license plate “program” consisted of government,
private, or mixed speech.  In fact, it appears that Johanns invalidated the third,
and possibly the fourth, factor of the test that the Fourth Circuit applied in
Rose.172  Coincidentally, these were also the two factors that were characteris-
tic of private speech and eventually led the Rose court to its “mixed speech”
classification.173  If, under Johanns, it was not essential for the government to
identify itself as the speaker, then the factors that the Rose court focused on
regarding “the identity of the literal speaker” or “whether the government or the
private entity [bore] the ultimate responsibility for the content of the speech”
were irrelevant.174  Instead, the crucial factors in determining whether the
170 Id. at 381 & n.2 (Boyce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d 770, 771-72 (M.D. Tenn. 2004).
172 See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792-93 (4th Cir. 2004); see
also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
173 See Rose, 361 F.3d at 792-94.
174 See generally id. at 792-93 (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of
the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)).  The Johanns Court
noted that while the government need not identify itself as the speaker, if the speech would
be attributed to someone who does not agree, the analysis would be different. Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564-65 (2005); see Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385-87
(Boyce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); supra note 117 and accompanying text.
That is not the case here because only those who agree display the “Choose Life” license
plate.
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speech was that of the government or of a private entity were the “central pur-
pose of the program” and the government’s “degree of editorial control.”175
In Johanns, the government program promoting beef was very similar to
the family planning program in Rust because it was fairly evident that the pur-
pose of the advertising campaign was to promote a specific government mes-
sage.176  Accordingly, the court in Johanns did not even address the purpose of
the program.177  Instead, it considered whether the government’s reliance on
private assistance and its failure to disclose its identity as the speaker barred the
speech from technically qualifying as government speech despite the fact that
the purpose was to promote a government message.178  The extent to which
private citizens played a role in designing and distributing the government mes-
sage did not affect the message’s status as government speech because the gov-
ernment approved the message, thus expressing a high degree of editorial
control.179  The fact that the government may have obscured its identity as the
message’s promoter was of no consequence.180  The government simply con-
tributed to the debate just as any private speaker would have:  by expressing
support for beef, albeit anonymously.
Likewise, within the specialty license plate forum, the government may
express a message and promote it by allowing private citizens that agree with
the message to assist in designing and distributing it.  The government’s edito-
rial control in Bredesen was achieved through supervision and approval of the
“Choose Life” message.  The issue of whether the government obscured its role
by involving private entities should have been irrelevant.
Thus, in light of Johanns, it appears that the Bredesen court properly clas-
sified the “Choose Life” specialty license plate program as government speech
and that the government had a right to express its message despite objections
from dissenters.  The government is not obligated to express views other than
its own, and in this respect, the government may properly “discriminate”
against other viewpoints.  Because the government is ultimately accountable to
the electorate for the messages that it chooses to promote, the political process
acts as a check upon the content of the government’s speech.181  Thus, the
Bredesen court was apparently correct to uphold the validity of the “Choose
Life” license plate program as its analysis on that point was well founded.182
The “Choose Life” license plate program also appears to be valid in the
context of a Rust and Rosenberger analysis because, similar to Rust (and
Johanns), its purpose is to promote a governmental message, not to facilitate
175 See generally Rose, 361 F.3d at 792-93 (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 288
F.3d at 618).
176 See Johanns, 544 U.S. 550.
177 See id.
178 Id. at 560.
179 Id. at 560-62.
180 Id. at 564.
181 Id. at 575 (citing Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
235 (2000); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977)).
182 But see Saumya Manohar, Look Who’s Talking Now:  “Choose Life” License Plates and
Deceptive Government Speech, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 229 (2006) (arguing that the
Fourth Circuit’s four factor approach is proper because it prevents the government from
monopolizing the marketplace of ideas).
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private speech.  Therefore, the government may define the scope of the pro-
gram in order to ensure that its message is not distorted.  The government
defined the scope of the “Choose Life” license plate program by approving the
message that the plate displayed and by ensuring that funds gathered from the
sales of the plate supported activities that were consistent with its message.
However, the fact that the Bredesen court properly characterized the
“Choose Life” license plate program as government speech does not necessa-
rily mean that the government can restrict private speech that expresses a dis-
senting view within the larger specialty license plate program.  The
idiosyncrasy in the facts of Bredesen is that the case involved a program within
a program.  It is within the larger specialty license plate program that the Rust
“scope of the program,” and the Rosenberger and Velazquez “facilitating pri-
vate speech” analyses really become relevant to the issue of viewpoint discrim-
ination.  The proper question thus becomes not whether the “Choose Life”
license plate program is invalid, but whether the government’s suppression of a
pro-choice viewpoint within the larger specialty license plate program is inva-
lid.  This Note argues that it is.
B. The Specialty License Plate Program
In contrast to the “Choose Life” license plate program, the specialty
license plate program does not qualify as a form of government speech.  The
specialty license plate program does not express or promote any governmental
message, but instead facilitates private speech by creating an opportunity for
private entities or organizations to express and promote their messages on a
license plate.  While the “Choose Life” license plate program does not create a
forum, the specialty license plate program does.  In that respect, the specialty
license plate program is much more like the programs in Rosenberger and
Velazquez than the programs in Rust and Johanns.
When the government creates a forum for private speech, it may express
editorial control over the subject matter of the speech, but not over the view-
points relating to otherwise permissible subjects.183  Therefore, in the Bredesen
case, the government clearly had the power to allow or disallow the subject of
abortion.  However, once it expressed its own view, or allowed a private entity
to express a view on the subject of abortion, it could no longer deny others the
same opportunity to express their views within the same forum.
When the government creates and controls a forum, it does not have limit-
less authority to control speech within it and cannot make access to the forum
depend upon governmental approval of the private message.184  Government-
created forums are subject to the same conventional rules that apply to ordi-
nary, limited public forums.185  Hence, the government must base any forum
restrictions upon some criteria that is permissible and not solely upon view-
point.  A contrary rule would allow the government to skew the debate on a
183 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
184 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
185 See id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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subject by promoting its view while simultaneously suppressing others.186
Without proper and balanced access to different views relating to a particular
subject, the public cannot make informed and intelligent decisions about how to
resolve contentious issues.  The principles of free speech, therefore, should not
allow the government to exclude different viewpoints, leaving the public to
depend upon government propaganda.  When the government is the only
speaker, the consequence is a distorted perception of the real problem that facil-
itates only the outcome that the government finds most politically
advantageous.
While Johanns was helpful in determining whether the “Choose Life”
license plate program was government speech, it would have provided little
guidance in analyzing whether the Bredesen specialty license plate program
consisted of government speech.  In Johanns, the context was one where the
Court had already determined that the purpose of the program was to express a
government message.187  In such a case, the government’s mere reliance on
private assistance in designing and distributing that message, or a failure to
disclose itself as the speaker of that message would not disqualify the speech
from the category of government speech.188  But, such considerations would
have been irrelevant in Bredesen where there was no message.189
There seems to be little merit to the argument that the specialty license
plate program expressed any broad governmental message in and of itself, or
that it served the purpose of promoting some government policy other than
facilitating private speech or providing a means for private organizations to
acquire funds.  In fact, the stated purpose of the specialty license plate program
was to provide funds to “departments, agencies, charities, programs and other
activities impacting Tennessee.”190  Only the specific individual license plates
contained within the larger specialty license plate program expressed a
message.
Furthermore, the State of Tennessee had approved several specialty
license plates that did not relate to any legitimate government interest or
express any message that the government was attempting to distribute through
private citizens.191  Among other things, the State had approved specialty
license plates that promoted fraternities, the Sons of Confederate Veterans,
football teams, and both in-state and out-of-state colleges.192
Thus, it appears that under the specialty license plate program, it is the
private organizations that seek the help of the government in expressing their
messages, not the government that seeks help from private organizations in
186 See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004); Geof-
frey R. Stone, Restriction of Speech Because of Its Content:  The Peculiar Case of Subject-
Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 108 (1978).
187 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005).
188 Id. at 564.
189 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834; see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 542 (2001).
190 TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201(j) (2003).
191 See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 382-85 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boyce, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192 Id. at 383 n.5.
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expressing its message.193  When the purpose of the program is to facilitate
private speech in such a manner, the government may not discriminate merely
because it disagrees.  While the government is free to agree with a private
organization and express support for an idea as a form of government speech,
the First Amendment prohibits the government from denying others an oppor-
tunity to express support for competing ideas within the same forum.194  The
mere fact that the government is speaking within a particular forum does not
mean that others must refrain from speaking within it.195
A Johanns analysis is also improper in the context of the specialty license
plate program because in Johanns, the government was not restricting access to
a forum, but rather, was compelling speech of dissenters, which is a different
type of First Amendment harm.196  To argue that the government’s right to
promote beef through the medium of television includes the right to prohibit
non-governmental entities from also expressing anti-beef messages on televi-
sion would be absurd.  Likewise, the government cannot prohibit pro-choice
speech within the medium of license plates simply because it chooses to
express a pro-life message within that same medium.197  The government prop-
erly chooses not to support a certain view by expressing a contrary view, not by
prohibiting others from expressing their support for a particular view on an
equal basis within the same forum.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits “have spoken on the
issue, reaching at least three different conclusions, via at least sixteen separate
opinions,”198 the United States Supreme Court might have been wise to address
the issue of government speech and viewpoint discrimination in the context of
the “Choose Life” license plate in Bredesen.  However, the Supreme Court
likely will have another opportunity to confront the issue when it inevitably
arises in another circuit.
In fact, a federal district court within the Seventh Circuit recently con-
cluded that a “Choose Life” license plate consisted of private speech and
directly expressed doubt as to the validity of the Bredesen court’s analysis and
conclusion.199  In Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v. White,200 the plaintiffs sued the
State of Illinois contending that its refusal to issue a “Choose Life” license
193 See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,
305 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2002).
194 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30.
195 See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 305 F.3d at 246.
196 See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385-86 (Boyce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197 On the other hand, it appears that, per Johanns and Rust, if the government wanted to
levy a tax upon all family planning service providers, it could choose to spend the funds to
advance only pro-life organizations even if some family planning service providers dis-
sented.  Similarly, the government could require all license plates to display a “Choose Life”
message but could not prohibit individuals that objected from concealing it per Wooley.
198 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380 n.1 (Boyce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199 Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 178455, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
19, 2007).
200 Id.
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plate was impermissible viewpoint discrimination even though the State had
not issued a license plate with a pro-choice view.201  The court applied the
Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test and determined that, under the circumstances,
the “Choose Life” license plate was private speech because private organiza-
tions had originated it.  As such, the court held that the State could not restrict
the plaintiffs’ message or discriminate against their view merely because it was
unpopular or addressed a contentious issue.  The court ordered the State to
issue a “Choose Life” license plate, concluding that “because we are dealing
with viewpoint discrimination in private speech, the forum is
inconsequential.”202
While the United States Supreme Court has examined the interaction
between government speech and viewpoint discrimination and provided a basic
framework for analysis, circuit courts are apparently unable to apply the
abstract analysis consistently to cases with dissimilar facts.  Ambiguities in the
analysis and its application to varying factual circumstances may leave too
much room for courts to employ discretion and curb individual rights in favor
of advancing government policies.  The result, as evidenced by the split among
the circuits, is an uneven distribution in the nature of fundamental rights that
citizens in one part of the country enjoy compared to those in another.  Addi-
tionally, the reluctance of the Supreme Court to resolve the inconsistent appli-
cation of the law has enhanced the “inherent risk that the [g]overnment seeks
not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or
information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than per-
suasion.”203  Until the United States Supreme Court clarifies the nature of gov-
ernment speech and its relationship to viewpoint discrimination, courts will
continue to produce inconsistent opinions affecting the fundamental right of
private citizens to access a forum without regard to viewpoint.
201 Id. at *3.
202 Id. at *9.
203 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
